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1. Introduction 
 
“Next Tuesday is Election Day. Next Tuesday all of you will go to the polls, will stand 
there in the polling place and make a decision. I think when you make that decision, it 
might be well if you would ask yourself, are you better off than you were four years 
ago? Is it easier for you to go and buy things in the stores than it was four years ago? Is 
there more or less unemployment in the country than there was four years ago?” 
Prior to the elections of 1980 for the United States Presidency the candidate of the 
Republicans, Ronald Reagan, pointed at the audience in a television debate and advised 
voters to ask themselves in the polling place: are you better of than you were four years 
ago? Ronald Reagan assumed that voters would make a retrospective judgment and that 
this retrospective judgment would have an impact on the likelihood of a vote for 
himself, in the case that the judgment was negative, or the incumbent president Jimmy 
Carter, in the case that the judgment was positive. Although Ronald Reagan spoke about 
the effects of Carters policies on the individual life of the voter (after all he advises to 
ask the question are you better off, in stead of are we, as in nation, better off) he also 
pointed at macro-level, by referring to the (un)employment. As will be shown in this 
thesis a more appropriate question would have been Are we better off than we were four 
years ago? Or more specific Is the economy better off than before? For the purpose of 
this thesis Reagans quote is adapted in order to cover the purpose of this study and used 
as title. 
The government of Prime Minister Mark Rutte resigned in april 2012 after the 
conclusion that the coalition parties could not agree on the measures to cut the budget 
deficit. New elections will follow in September 2012. The Netherlands Bureau for 
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Economic Policy Analysis (in Dutch: Centraal Plan Bureau) concluded in December of 
2011 that the Dutch Economy got in a recession again and that the budget deficit 
increased.1 It is clear for every voter that the Netherlands is facing, just as most other 
European countries, profound economic problems. The Rutte cabinet was in charge to 
solve these economic problems, but has the government policies been successful? This 
question and the question Reagan posed will probably be posed as well by party leaders 
prior to the elections for the Dutch parliament in September 2012. Are you better off 
now than before the Rutte cabinet came in office? Are we as nation better off than 
before the Rutte cabinet came in office? Is the economy better off than before the Rutte 
cabinet came in office? It seems crucial to the electoral outcomes, but is that really true? 
The aim of this study is to examine the impact of the economy on electoral 
outcomes. The central research question is What is the impact of the economy on 
electoral outcomes in the Netherlands? In order to answer this research question first 
the existing literature and theories will be reviewed to attain a complete understanding 
of the relationship between the economy and electoral outcomes. Subsequently the 
research question will be modified into a workable question and a research design to 
answer this question will be made. Finally the research design will be executed to 
provide an answer on the central question. 
 
1.1 Scientific and societal relevance 
The available studies on the relationship between the economy and the vote in the 
Netherlands are limited. The existing studies will be reviewed in the theory party of this 
thesis, but the conclusion is, as we will see, that an extensive study, that goes beyond 
                                                      
1
 http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2011/12/13/cpb-cijfers-nederland-in-recessie-extra-bezuinigingen-nodig/ 
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the simple bivariate analyses, of the impact of economic evaluations on government 
support at different elections is almost never been done. This study contributes to a 
better understanding of economic voting in the Netherlands by offering that study. The 
results can show to what extent economic evaluations increase the likelihood of 
government support, and how this impact is related to the impact in other elections and 
contexts. From a societal perspective, this research makes clear how Dutch voters 
evaluate the government policies and what kind of effect this can have on the electoral 
outcomes. It can be useful information for politicians and policy makers prior to the 
elections in September 2012 and after.  
2. Literature Review 
 
In order to answer the proposed research question in the introduction of this study, first 
the existing literature will be reviewed. The starting point will be the literature on how 
voters derive at their party choice, to understand how the relationship between the 
economy and electoral outcomes fits into the model of party choice. Subsequently the 
literature on economic voting will be reviewed, by discussing the most prominent 
debates in the field of economic voting. Finally the results of studies on economic 
voting in the Netherlands will be discussed. Based on this literature review a statistical 
model will be build to assess the impact of the economy on electoral outcomes in the 
Netherlands. 
 
2.1 The explanation of Party Choice 
Electoral choices are in democratic systems at the center of the political process. The 
editors of The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, Dalton and Klingemann (2007), 
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provide a short overview of the developments in electoral research. According to them 
early electoral research made the assumption that most citizens are unable to deal with 
the complexity of politics and that they, therefore, have to rely on shortcuts, such as 
group cues, heuristics or affective partisan loyalties. The classic work from Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967) took this approach and focused on social cleavages and stable party-
voter alignments. Their idea was that political decisions are guided by enduring social 
cleavages, which has led to stable party-voter alignments. Back in these years scholars 
had the supposition that people’s electoral behavior was determined by their social 
background, such as their religion or social class. However, nowadays the alignment 
between voter and parties is not that solid anymore, so social positions are not a good 
predictor any more for political positions as they were decades ago. Thomassen (2005) 
claims that this is caused by changes in the composition of the electorate and the 
relationship between social position and electoral behavior. He observes a 
modernization process in the model of party choice. 
For a complete understanding of how voters derive at a party choice and what 
Thomassen means with the modernization process, it is wise to fall back on the 
Michigan framework, of party choice, often referred to as the funnel of causality. The 
Michigan framework, named after the scholars from the University of Michigan who 
designed the framework, is a conceptual framework, designed to explain party choice. 
This framework relies on the principle that diverse factors has an influence on the party 
choice, and that these factors are in causal relations with each other. Basically the model 
suggests that demographic characteristics, such as age, religion or social class, lead to 
psychological affiliations and biases, such as party identification or ideological 
orientations, and that these long-term predispositions modifies short-term factors such 
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as the assessment of parties and candidates in relation to political issues and government 
performance and that finally these short-term factors determine the party choice. 
(Campbell et al, 1960) According to Thomassen this model is the main theoretical 
approach in electoral research. It is hardly impossible to think of any other theoretical 
approach or set of variables that would not fit in this model. Dalton and Klingemann 
conclude that social position no longer determines political positions. Long-term 
predispositions based on social position or partisanship declined and made research on 
electoral behavior shift to short-term factors such as candidate-image and issue-
opinions. (2007: 10-11) This conclusion is also endorsed by Thomassen (2005), who 
argues that short-term factors as issues, retrospective judgments and political leaders 
gradually became more powerful as explanatory factors of voting behavior. However, it 
would be a mistake to present the different approaches of explaining party choice as 
competing models. If you want to examine the explanatory power of short-term factors 
you still have to control for preceding variables as social structure and long-term 
predispositions. These developments point in the direction that judgments about the 
economy can be of increasingly importance in the decision making process of voters. 
According to Rose and McAllister, cited by Andeweg and Irwin (2005: 97), the 
Netherlands were in the mid-1960s a classic example of a structured system of multi-
party competition in which the electorate has been determined along the two dimensions 
religion and class, each sustaining separate political parties. The shift in explaining 
electoral behavior as described by Dalton and Klingemann and Thomassen is 
observable in the Netherlands. The Netherlands has shifted to an open system, with 
some structure provided by ideological differences, but even polarization along this line 
is decreasing. The importance of short-term factors in influencing and explaining voting 
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behavior has increased. The influence of every short term factor may vary from election 
to election, at least the possibility for short term factors to have influence exist. 
(Andeweg and Irwin, 2005: 109) 
 
2.2 The economy and the vote 
Tufte, one of the most cited scholars in the field of Economic Voting, articulated in 
1978 a basic principle: When you think economics, think elections; when you think 
elections, think economics. (1978: 65) In the previous decades many scholars devoted 
attention to the relationship between the economy and electoral outcomes. According to 
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier the flow of scholarly papers on economic voting evolved 
from a trickle to a torrent of over 300 articles and books. (2000: 183) It is therefore 
hardly impossible to provide an overview of the existing literature about economic 
voting. In order to distill the most influential literature, the most easy way is to dive into 
some literature reviews about economic voting that exist, see for example Monroe 
(1984), Kiewiet & Rivers (1985), Lewis Beck (1988), Nannestad & Paldam (1994), 
Anderson (1995), Norpoth (1996), Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000), Anderson (2007) 
and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007). In order to attain a complete understanding of 
how the relationship between economics and electoral outcomes works different debates 
in the field of economic voting will be discussed. This review will start with the 
theoretic roots of the relationship between the economy and electoral outcomes. 
Subsequently retrospective voting and the reward punishment model will be discussed, 
and its counterpart prospective voting. Then attention will be devoted on the target of 
economic evaluations by elaborating on sociotropic and pocketbook voting. The impact 
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of the institutional context on economic voting will be reviewed and finally what is 
known about economic voting in the Netherlands will be handled. 
 
2.3 Theoretic roots of relationship economy and electoral outcomes 
The relationship between the economy and electoral outcomes is based on the 
assumption that the electorate holds the government accountable, which, in turn, is 
rooted in the idea that a representative government is the only practical way to govern 
nation-states democratically. Because of the size, scope and complexity of the 
contemporary nation-states it is impossible for most citizens to participate directly in the 
administration of the state. Therefore they suspend their control in exchange for a 
minimum of possibilities of political participation. It was Schumpeter in 1942 who 
described the design of a modern representational democracy as a political system in 
which the people “have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule 
them” (1942: 269). Schmitter and Karl endorsed this view on the democracy and 
defined democracy as “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for 
their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition 
and operation of their elected representatives” (1991: 76). From these perspectives you 
can consider elections as an institution to grant citizens the power to delegate their 
authority to people who have to act on their behalf and therefore act responsibly. This 
institutional design makes sure that citizens hold the politicians accountable for the 
government’s record. 
To what extent citizens are able to fulfill this minimal responsibility in the 
democratic system is subject of debate for over decades. According to Almond and 
Verba a well functioning democracy demands responsive, well-informed and interested 
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citizens. (1963) We are far away from the idea of a competent citizen as sketched by 
Aristoteles. Back in the sixties, Converse showed us that citizens do not possess clear 
belief systems and do not approach political issues through an ideological lens. Most 
citizens do have low-quality opinions, if they have opinions at all. High-quality 
opinions, defined by Converse (1964), but also by Zaller (1992), as being stable, 
consistent, informed and connected to abstract principles and values are very rare in the 
mass public. They have the information nor the motivation and capacity to fulfill their, 
as what some scholars might describe, democratic duty and judge fairly the governance 
performance. Clawson and Oxley sketch the landscape of the different views on the 
need for an informed and participative citizenry. On one hand of the spectrum you will 
find scholars who argue that without informed citizens a citizen cannot make political 
decisions and therefore the political system is unable to function well. Other scholars 
argue that citizens can make reasonable decisions without being knowledgeable, 
interested or attentive to politics, because they use informational shortcuts, such as cues 
from persons or groups they trust, in order to function in the democratic system. This is 
in line with more elitist democratic theorists who take the position that the ignorance of 
citizens will lead to a flourishing democracy, because an attentive citizenry will cause 
unnecessary interventions in the political process. (Clawson and Oxley, 2008: 183-184) 
 
2.4 Retrospective voting: the reward and punishment model 
Although citizens are far away from the ideal, how do we explain that accountability in 
politics still exist? Are the choices of citizens actually so unclear as we think they are? 
Fiorina argues that citizens do not need to know the precise policies in order to see or 
feel the results of those policies. In order to judge whether the government performed 
12 
 
well, citizens only need to calculate the changes in their own welfare (1981: 5) This 
argument is based on the theory, introduced by Key, that voters play the rational god of 
vengeance and reward (1964: 568). Key believes that voters judges governance 
performance retrospectively and build their choice at judgment day on their past 
experience and Key sees the electorate in a role of appraiser of past events, past 
performance and past actions. (1966: 61) Anderson elaborates on this argument and 
underlines the role of the economy in this retrospective judgment of the government 
performance: Given citizens’ limited willingness and capacity to process complex 
information about politics, reward and punishment should most easily be detectable 
with regard to the performance of the economy. Judging economic performance is 
namely more straightforward for average citizens than other areas of government 
performance. (Anderson, 1995; Anderson, 2007) The standard model suggested by Key 
assumes a naïve reward-and-punishment calculus. Kramer examined the model 
suggested by Key and assumed that the following type is operative: “if the performance 
of the incumbent party is ‘satisfactory’ according to some simple standard, the voter 
votes to retain the incumbent governing party in office to enable it to continue its 
present policies; while if the incumbent’s performance is not ‘satisfactory’, the voter 
votes against the incumbent, to give the opposition party a chance to govern” (1971: 
134). According to the literature reviews of Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007, and 
Anderson (2007), the reward-punishment hypothesis is still the most central hypothesis 
in the existing literature on economic voting.  
One shortcoming on the reward and punishment model is that it does not take into 
account that various aspects of the government will be judged differently by different 
people or political groups in the electorate. Parties will also have different economic 
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priorities, for instance more left-oriented parties are in most cases more concerned about 
the levels of unemployment, where right-wing parties probably would devote more 
attention to concerns about increasing levels of inflation. This partisan view on 
economic voting is of obvious relevance for understanding the relationship between the 
economy and electoral outcomes. (Listhaug, 2005: 216) 
 
2.5 Asymmetry of economic evaluations 
The reward punishment model seems to make sense in order to explain government 
support by looking at the economic evaluations. Some scholars claim that the effects of 
bad evaluations are not in balance with the effects of good evaluations. According to 
these scholars, it seems that the effects of a bad economy on the vote choice last longer 
than the effects of a good economy. In terms of Key, this means that voters are more 
likely to act as a god of vengeance, than as a god of reward. This point is raised by the 
study of Campbell and colleagues in their very oft cited publication The American 
Voter. An explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the idea that the electorate 
simply expects that the government deliver good economic results and that only in bad 
economic times voters pay a lot of attention to the status and handling of the economy. 
In the literature on economic voting this phenomenon is called ‘negativity effect’ or the 
‘asymmetry of economic evaluations. 
The evidence for this phenomenon is not unambiguous. The study of Lewis-Beck 
on economic voting in five major countries showed that “the electorates are even-
handed, in their economic judgments, voting for governments that are liked, against 
governments that are disliked”. (1988: 79) The study of Kiewiet (1983) showed more or 
less the same results. Good economic evaluations had almost the same predictive power 
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of voting for the incumbent, as negative evaluations had on the predictive power of not 
voting for the incumbent. The debate on negativity effects is yet undecided. 
A different approach on the strength of the relationship between negative (or 
positive) evaluations on voting for the incumbent (or opposition) leads to a similar 
conclusion. Evans and Anderson (2006) argue, according to Vorselaars (2009), that in 
disastrous economy “economic evaluations will be less affected by political 
determinants (such as party identification) as there are very strong cues from the 
economy itself.” This might be an explanation for the small effect of bad evaluations of 
the Dutch economy on the loyalty of voters in the Netherlands. The saliency of the issue 
the economy might have an effect on the degree of economic voting in the Netherlands. 
This fits well in the research done by Powell and Whitten (1993), Wilkin and colleagues 
(1997), Anderson (2000) and Nadeau and colleagues (2002), who stated that in 
institution contexts in which the responsibility of the economy is not clarified voters are 
less likely to blame or praise the government. The institutional context will be discussed 
later in this literature review. Both approaches hint in the direction that in bad economic 
times the economic evaluations have more effect on political considerations than in 
more prosperous times. 
 
2.6 Prospective voting 
However the bulk of the empirical research is based on the reward punishment model, 
there are also some investigations on prospective effects. It is possible to draw a 
distinction in the literature between prospective models and retrospective models. Do 
voters look ahead and choose between two hypothetical future paths, or do they look 
back and evaluate the trend from past to present? The first option, prospective voting, 
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finds it origins in research done by Downs back in the fifties of the precious century. 
Downs makes the argument that “when a man votes, he is helping to select the 
government which will govern him during the coming election period” (1957: 39). This 
does not mean that these expectations about the future has nothing to do with 
evaluations of the past. According to Fiorina, knowledge of the past figures importantly 
in expectations for the future. Downs argues that when a party is in power, you should 
take the incumbent present policies, rather than promises. Downs assumes that voters 
extrapolate future actions from past actions and calculate the consequences of those 
actions in future environments. (1981: 196) This shows that even Downs is not very 
confident about the abilities of citizens to predict the future, because he argues that 
citizens take party’s current performance as the best bet for future performance. When 
you consider the voting model as truly prospective, you expect that a rational voter 
ought to make a decision based on a comparison of future benefits. Voters should ask 
themselves which party is the most likely to deliver a prosperous time after the election, 
regardless of their track record so far. (Norpoth, 1996: 315) Fiorina explored the impact 
of economic expectations of problems around unemployment and inflation by asking 
respondents whether they thought that these problems would be better handled by the 
Democrats or the Republicans. He found that the economic expectations outperformed 
complex retrospective items. Studies from Kuklinksi and West (1981), Chappell and 
Keech (1985, 1991), Sanders (1991) and Lockerbie (1992), Lanoue (1994) and Clarke 
and Stewart (1994) point into the same direction. A study done by Lewis-Beck in 1988 
led to the conclusion that prospective personal finances were a statistically economic 
predictor for vote intention, where prospective personal finances were not. Nadeau and 
Lewisbeck examined in a pooled analysis the impact of an Economic Future Indes 
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(EFI), equal to the percentage who think business conditions over the next twelve monts 
will be “good” minus the percentage who think they will be “bad” and found that this 
index has about the same impact as the National Business Index, equal to the percentage 
who said the economy was “better” than before minus the percentage who said it was 
“worse”. (2001: 172-175) 
 
2.7 Sociotropic versus pocketbook voting 
Another debate in the field of literature on economic voting has evolved around the 
question what types of economic conditions voter consider. You can consider the 
economy as a political issue that really touches the citizens, because it has an effect on 
their personal environment. It is therefore not strange that the conventional wisdom 
among politicians and citizens is that citizens vote according to their pocketbook. In the 
end every citizen has the aim for personal prosperity and if you really want to attain this 
goal the political decision making process should be guided by considerations about the 
personal economic conditions. In the literature this phenomenon is called pocketbook 
voting. The opposite, when a vote is based on considerations about the national 
economic situation, is called sociotropic voting. In contrary to what one might expect, 
the hypothesis that a voter is guided by his or her personal economic conditions is not 
very broad supported in the literature. The research done by Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) 
showed that people reacted to changes in national economic conditions and government 
competence in stead of changes in their pocketbooks. Kiewiet (1983) offers a more 
extensive specification and this study shows that the pocketbook variable consistently 
fails to reach a conventional level of statistical significance. An explanation for these 
contra-intuitive results is offered in what is called the ‘ethic of self-reliance’, Americans 
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feel responsible for their personal economic well-being, not the government, also in bad 
times. (Norpoth, 1996: 312) Lewis-Beck (1988) expanded the research done by Kinder 
and Kiewiet into a comparative study of five European countries and found similar 
results. This points in the direction that we are not speaking about a phenomenon 
specifically related to the American culture. Citizens attribute responsibility to the 
government for the shape of the macro economy. The government has the task to take 
care for low levels of unemployment, avoid recessions and secure stable prices, not to 
make individual citizens richer. According to Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007) 
sociotropic effects on voting behavior are normally larger than pocketbook effects. 
However, this does not mean that no evidence for pocketbook voting is available 
and that sociotropic voting is endorsed by all scholars. The strongest critique is coming 
from Kramer, who claims that the evidence for sociotropic voting is artifactual. His 
argument is that individual perceptions on the economy may be flawed, contaminated 
and biased. He states that the perception of the national economic condition as a 
parameter is “in general so badly and unpredicatably biased as to be essentially 
unrelated to the underlying individual-level behavioral relationship we are trying to 
estimate” (1983: 93). Furthermore he argues that the distinction between pocketbook 
and sociotropic perceptions is very difficult to make from a conceptual and 
methodological point of view. Kramer certainly has a point, but opponents argue that no 
good alternative is available and that excluding individual perceptions from the analysis 
would be too rigorous. 
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2.8 Institutional Context 
Another shortcoming of the reward punishment model is that we find very mixed results 
in cross-national comparisons. While generally most of the cross-national studies were 
positive, the results were not always as consistent as expected. Lewis-Beck (1988) 
found in a study on the effects of the economy on the electoral outcome in Britain, 
Spain, Germany, France and Italy differences in the explanatory power of the economy. 
He attributed these differences to what he called coalitional complexity. The more 
parties in the government, the more diffusion of government responsibility for 
managing the economy, what makes it harder for the voter to blame, and therefore the 
economic vote is diluted. (Lewis-Beck, 1988: 105) Many other studies point in the 
direction that the institutional context of a country has a big impact on the effects of the 
economy on electoral outcomes. The relationship between the economy, more specific 
economic evaluations and electoral outcomes is based on the assumption that citizens 
hold the incumbent parties responsible for the government performance. From that 
perspective the citizens need to know who they can hold responsible for the government 
performance. Powell and Whitten (1993) elaborated on the coalitional complexity 
hypothesis, suggested by Lewis-Beck, and designed a study to take the ‘clarity of 
responsibility’ for economic outcomes and the ‘alternatives for dissent’ into account. 
Their conclusion is that the political context matter, since economic voting can only 
occur when citizens are able to attribute responsibility to the government. This is a 
support for the claim made by Lewis-Beck. Wilkin and colleagues (1997) did a world-
wide test of economic voting and argue that, because of the lack of clarity, citizens 
focus on the major incumbent party and hold them accountable for the economic 
performance. Anderson (2000) elaborated on the research of Powell and Whitten and 
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argued that voters’ ability to express discontent is enhanced when mechanisms of 
accountability are simple. Nadeau and colleagues (2002) expanded the index of 
responsibility and find a strong relationship between the clarity of responsibility and the 
level of economic voting. They showed that in high clarity countries economic 
evaluations are moderately strong force on intended vote and that in other countries 
economic evaluations make a much smaller contribution. However, even in those 
countries voters will, under prospitious conditions credit or blame the government for 
the economic situations.” (Nadeau et al, 2002: 414-415) A general conclusion of the 
existing literature can be that it is arguable that the conclusion that voters in diffused 
institutional settings do not know who to blame is too rigid, but it makes the decision-
process more complex and therefore the explanatory power of the economy on electoral 
outcomes decreases. According to the literature by Powell and Whitten (1993), Wilkin 
and colleagues (1997), Anderson (2000) and Nadeau and colleagues (2002), The 
Netherlands does not score high on the level of clarity of who is responsible, because of 
their multiparty system.  
 
2.9 Economic Voting in the Netherlands 
Although Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier start with the remark that the papers on economic 
voting did evolve from a trickle to a torrent of over 300 articles in their literature review 
on economic voting, they also make the remark that most of these articles are carried 
out in only a few countries. They conclude that for almost every established democracy 
at least one paper can be cited, but that for most of the nations besides countries like the 
United States, France or Britain, the literature on economic voting is represented by one 
investigator, one approach or one article. (2000: 207) This seems the case for the 
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Netherlands, because there are limited studies done on economic voting in The 
Netherlands. 
Respondents were asked in the Dutch Parliamentary Election Surveys of 1986 for 
the first time to assess the government performance on the economy. Therefore hardly 
any study on economic voting in the Netherlands exist from before 1986. Pellikaan 
found in his research on the elections of 1986 evidence for the hypothesis that voters 
who assessed government performance more negatively are more likely to vote for a 
opposition party. He also found evidence that the level of satisfaction of the government 
performance is related to party preference. If the political orientation of the respondent 
is in line with the political orientation of the government, the respondent is more likely 
to be satisfied with the government performance. (1987: 117-119) Rodenhuis studied 
the existence of prospective voting at the same elections and concluded that respondents 
who intended to vote for a government parties had better expectations of the effects of 
that cabinet. (1987: 130) Aarts and colleagues more or less drew the same conclusions 
for the elections of 1989 as Pellikaan and Rodenhuis did for the elections of 1986. 
Although there is one exception: Aarts and colleagues interpreted the relationship 
between economic evaluations and intention to vote for a government party the other 
way around, the government performance on the national economic situation, 
employment and personal economic situation is better evaluated by supporters of the 
government parties. More intensive research is needed to shed more light on the 
relationship between economic evaluations and electoral outcomes. 
Irwin and Van Holsteyn (1997) did research on the election results of the Dutch 
elections in 1994, which showed that the stability of Dutch politics did not longer exist. 
They showed that short-term factors, such as the state of the economy had a 
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considerable impact on the electoral outcome. A combination of lower loyalty towards 
the government parties and a increased size of dissatisfied groups contributed to the 
poor results of the incumbent government parties, the Dutch labour party PvdA and the 
Christian-Democrats, CDA. They conclude that voters who feel that the policies had an 
unfavorable effect on the economic conditions only slightly less likely to remain loyal 
to the party they used to vote for. (1997: 99-103) Kaashoek studied the same elections 
and drew a similar conclusion. The unfavorable assessment of the performance of the 
government parties on the economy certainly played a role in the decision making 
process of voters. The tendency to vote for a opposition party in stead of a government 
party was high among every group of voters, but by far the highest among voters who 
assessed the government performance as unfavorable. It seems that there is a 
relationship between the retrospective judgment of the voters and their change of party 
choice. (1995: 204) The impact of the economy on the election results for the elections 
of 1998 and 2002 are quite in contrary to the findings for the elections in 1994. In 1998 
almost everyone seemed to pleased and wished to continue the government, because the 
governmental performance and the economy and employment had been favorable. In 
2002, fully two-third of the electorate felt that the government had a favorable impact 
on the economy. Yet, the three coalition parties responsible for the solid economic 
performance lost 43 of their 97 seats in the parliament. Van Holsteyn and Irwin 
conclude therefore that it was certainly not the economy that was uppermost in the 
minds of Dutch voters when they casted their vote. (2003: 54-55) 
Middendorp and Kolkhuis Tanke did an attempt to integrate previous approaches 
to economic voting and concluded that about 10 to 15% of the Dutch vote can be 
considered as determined by economic evaluations, mainly of the perception of 
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government policies’ effect on the National Economic Condition, but at the same time 
conclude that the major determinants of the vote are still religion, social class and 
various ideological stands. Furthermore they raised the question to what extent 
economic evaluations were determined by party identification, but are unable to provide 
a clear answer on that question. (1990: 548-551) Swank and Eisinga found also support 
for the conventional responsibility hypothesis that voters reward the government for 
favorable economic outcomes and punish it for unfavorable economic outcomes. They 
add to this hypothesis the prediction that right-wing political parties benefit from poor 
economic growth prospects, in contrary to more left-wing parties. (1999: 211) This 
conclusion is not been found in other studies on economic voting in the Netherlands. 
Finally, Listhaug did a cross-country analysis on the relationship between economic 
evaluations and the support for the incumbent parties. Based on a regression analysis for 
the elections of 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1998 Listhaug concludes that the effect of 
evaluations of the governments performance on the general economic situation is strong 
and in line with the incumbency hypothesis, so economic evaluations matter. (2005: 
226-228) The studies of Rodenhuis (1987), Van Holsteyn and Irwin (1997), 
Middendorp and Kolkhuis Tanke (1990) and Listhaug found evidence that evaluations 
of the national economic situation had a larger impact on the electoral outcomes than 
evaluations of the personal economic situation. According to Van Holsteyn and Irwin 
this corresponds with “that found in other countries that sociotropic voting appears to be 
of greater importance than pocketbook voting” (1997: 103). Vorselaars (2009) argued in 
her award winning Master Thesis about the attribution of economic responsibility in 
The Netherlands that voters do not distinguish between the economic responsibilities of 
individual coalition partners and that, even without an attribution of economic 
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responsibility, economic voting is still possible as an implicit attribution of economic 
responsibility is also possible through economic evaluations. These evaluations are 
more determined by what the government has done than other factors and therefore 
economic evaluations can be used as independent variables in economic voting 
research. 
Another country that often is used as a contrary case to the cases of United States 
and Britain is Denmark. Denmark is used in order to examine economic voting in a 
small, continental, multiparty democracy. In line with the findings of studies on 
economic voting in the Netherlands cross-sectional survey research has found 
substantial economic voting in Denmark as well. Nannestad and Paldam found 
convincing evidence that economic evaluations lead to electoral outcomes. Striking in 
this study is that they found strong evidence that pocketbook effects dominated the 
sociotropic effects. (1995: 57) Borre employed a study in the same time period and 
found, completely in contrary to the results of Nannestad and Paldam, that there were 
never significant pocketbook effects, but always significant collective effects. (1997: 
359) Although the findings intersect with each other, it is evidence that in multiparty 
systems where the responsibility for voters might be unclear economic voting also 
occurs. 
 
3. Applied theory 
This study is designed to explain electoral outcomes. More specific as discussed in the 
literature review the Michigan framework is the most used framework by electoral 
researchers to explain voting behavior. Scholars can deliberate about what factors 
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actually need to be taken into account when explaining vote choice, but as Thomassen 
stated it is hardly impossible to think of any alternative theoretical approach that would 
not fit into this model. Therefore in this study the Michigan framework will be used as 
starting point for our research design. In short the framework hypothesizes that the 
social background of a voter has an influence on the long-term predispositions, that 
these long-term pre-dispositions modifies the positions of the voter on short-term 
factors, and that these position in the end determines his voting behavior. The impact of 
every factor in the framework can differ over time, can differ in different contexts and 
can be different for every voter of course. According to this framework retrospective 
judgments of the performance of the government is modified by a voters party 
identification and ideological orientation, which in turn is influenced by someone’s 
social background. This retrospective judgments will determine the vote choice, at least 
for one part. 
Furthermore, in the literature review is discussed that the social structure of the 
society is changing. This development has put the relationship between social position 
and electoral behavior under pressure. A shift over time towards more short term factors 
as the most predictive factors in the Michigan Framework can be expected, as a result of 
the decreasing influence of the social structure on electoral behavior. This theoretical 
argument will also be taken in account when building the research design.  
This study has the aim to examine the influence of the economy on electoral 
outcomes. The reward punishment model provides answers on what the relationship 
between the economy and electoral outcomes looks like. Basically the argument is that 
voters, when they have to make a vote decision, evaluate economic conditions and 
compare these conditions with the conditions at the last elections. They hold the 
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government accountable for the changes in these conditions. When the conditions are 
better than before, the voter will be more likely to reward the government with their 
vote. When they evaluate the economic conditions more negatively, the voter will be 
more likely to punish the government and vote for the opposition. 
The reward punishment model fits very well in the Michigan Framework and is 
therefore chosen as theoretic approach for this study As is discussed in the literature 
review scholars have debated the target of economic evaluations, national economic 
conditions or personal economic conditions. In this study the assessments of both the 
national economic conditions, as the personal economic conditions will be incorporated 
in order to shed a little bit more light on this question. 
Drawing on the theoretical argument in the literature that suggests that bad news 
drives out good news, it can be expected that bad evaluations have a bigger impact on 
electoral behavior than good evaluations. In other words voters tend to punish harder 
than they would reward. This argument will also be a fundament for our research 
design. 
 
4. Main Concepts 
This study is designed in order to examine the influence of the economy on electoral 
outcomes. The model to study this relationship is based on the theory that the likelihood 
for a vote on the incumbent government increases when the evaluations of the economic 
conditions are more positive. The concept that needs to be explained is therefore the 
support for the incumbent government at the next elections. Deriving from the reward 
punishment model the other important concept, the economy, has to be translated into 
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the assessment of the economy by voters. Economic evaluations are therefore 
conceptualized as the evaluation of the economic conditions, both national economic 
conditions and personal economic conditions. 
According to the Michigan Framework other factors that might explain 
government support has to be taken into account as well. For the social structure of the 
voter gender, age, religion, social class and education will be incorporated. For the long-
term predispositions the ideological orientation of the voter and party identification will 
be incorporated. And for short-term factors a voters faith in the incumbent prime-
minister and the sympathy scores for the party leaders of the incumbent government 
parties will be incorporated. 
5. Research Question and Hypotheses 
In the introduction to this thesis the main research question is formulated: What is the 
impact of national and personal economic conditions on voting behavior? Based on the 
literature review this research question needs to become a little bit more specified in 
order to make a well executable research design. The more specified research question 
that will be addressed in this study is: 
What is the impact of a voter’s evaluation of national and personal economic conditions 
on his likelihood for supporting the government at the elections in The Netherlands? 
 
In order to get a full understanding of the impact of the economy on electoral outcomes 
in The Netherlands the following hypotheses will be tested. Drawing on the literature it 
can be expected that voters who perceive the national economic conditions more 
positive, are more likely to vote for the incumbent government. This expectation is 
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formulated in a way that we can actually test the relationship between the concept of 
evaluation of economic conditions and government support.  
H1a: Voters with a positive (negative) evaluation of the government’s performance on 
the national economic conditions are more (less) likely to support the government. 
Subsequently we test the hypothesis that people who perceive their personal economic 
conditions more positive, are more likely to vote for the incumbent government. 
H1b: Voters with a positive (negative) evaluation of the government’s performance on 
their personal economic conditions are more (less) likely to support the government. 
The debate on whether voters base their vote on evaluations of the national economic 
conditions or on evaluations of their personal economic conditions seems to be decided 
in the advantage of sociotropic voting. Therefore, it can be expected that the impact of 
evaluations of national economic conditions is greater than the impact of evaluations of 
personal economic conditions. This expectation is formulated in hypothesis 2: 
H2: The impact of a positive evaluation of the government’s performance on national 
economic conditions on the likelihood for government support is greater than the 
impact of a positive evaluation of the government performance on personal economic 
conditions on the likelihood for government support. 
According to the literature a shift towards a bigger role for short-term factors in the 
decision making process for voters should be observable. Thus, it can be expected that 
over time the impact of the evaluations of economic conditions on the likelihood for 
government support increases. This expectation is formulated in hypothesis 3: 
H3: The impact of a positive evaluation of the government’s performance on national 
(personal) economic conditions on the likelihood for government support increases 
over time. 
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The theoretical argument that the impact of negative evaluations will be greater on the 
electoral outcomes than positive evaluations have to lead to an increase in the impact of 
the evaluations on government support when the economic conditions in general will be 
assessed as negative. This expectation is formulated in hypothesis 4: 
H4: The impact of a positive evaluation of the government’s performance on national 
(personal) economic conditions on the likelihood for government support increases 
when in general the evaluations of the government’s performance are more negative. 
 
6. Data and Case Selection 
This research is designed to provide an answer on the question what the impact is of 
national and personal economic conditions on voting behavior in the Netherlands. To 
provide an answer on this question a cross-sectional design is made, and the existing 
data of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Surveys will be used. The pooled data of the 
elections of 1971 to 2006 provide the opportunity to look behind the dynamics of a 
single election and therefore overcome the differences that occur when you compare the 
results of previous studies on economic voting. The research aims to investigate how 
citizens in the Netherlands make their vote choice, so the units of analysis are 
individuals and the case selection will be a random selection of Dutch adult citizens. 
Under the guidance of an inter-university workgroup in the last four decades 
every national parliamentary election was followed by a large scale, nationwide 
electoral research project. These Dutch National Election Studies are designed to enable 
researchers to do an in-depth investigation of the backgrounds of party choice and 
changes thereof. (Todosijevic et al, 2010) Because the studies were held after every 
election, electoral behavior and political orientations in the Netherlands can be studied 
29 
 
in a systematic way from the early 1970s up to the national election of 2006. The 
questions within the studies are divided in three categories based on their origins; 
administrative and contextual variables, socio-demographical variables such as religion 
and social class and more specific survey variables, such as long term dispositions as 
party identification or ideological orientation and more short term factors as political 
and social issues or the evaluation of government performance. 
In this study we will use the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies of 1986, 1989, 
1994, 1998, 2002, 2003 and 2006, for one simple reason. In the Dutch Parliamentary 
Election Studies of 1986 respondents were asked for the first time after their perceptions 
of the national economic situation and their personal economic situation. This variable 
is crucial for our research, so we will not make use of the DPES prior to 1986. 
Furthermore, in 2002 the first Balkenende Cabinet resigned after only only 85 days and 
new elections were announced. Because these elections came so soon after the elections 
in May 2002 the organizers of the DPES decided to collect only data after the elections 
of 2003, due to practical problems. All respondents that participated in the post-election 
wave of 2002 were again approached for the post-election wave of 2003. As we will 
see, the absence of a pre-election wave in 2003 makes it impossible to do a same 
analysis of the impact of economic perceptions on voting behavior for the election of 
2003 as we will do for the other elections in the time period 1986-2006. The number of 
respondents for the Dutch Parliamentary Election Surveys used in this research design 
are at least 1271 (in the case of the elections of 2003) and up to 2623 (in the case of the 
elections of 2006) 
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7. Operationalization and Measurement 
 
7.1 Dependent Variable: Government Support 
The aim of this research is to examine the impact of evaluations of national and 
personal economic conditions on voting behavior of citizens. The dependent variable 
that will be explained is government support, because we expect that voters with more 
positive evaluations are more likely to support the government. In line with most 
existing approaches to economic voting this is operationalized in a dichotomy, the voter 
supports (in the form of a vote) the government parties (coded as 1) or supports (in the 
form of a vote) the opposition parties (coded as 0). The focus on the dichotomy seems 
to make sense because if economic conditions in any way have an impact on voting, 
according to the literature this must involve an assessment of who is to be praised or 
blamed for the state of the economy. (Anderson, 1995) 
Van der Brug and colleagues (2007) make an important claim that in countries 
with a multi-party system where multiple parties compete for the vote, the dichotomy 
government-opposition does not adequately represent the choices voters make (2007: 8-
15). Although Van der Brug and colleagues raise a very valid point, three arguments 
made that is chosen for the ordinary distinction between support (in the form of a vote) 
for government parties or opposition parties. First, the model that is designed to explain 
government support is based on the theory that citizens reward the government with a 
vote or punish them with a vote for an alternative (opposition) party. Although handling 
the variety of possible choices at the elections as a choice for government parties or 
opposition parties, might be a simplified representation of the reality, it is the most valid 
operationalization of the reward punishment theory in to a research design. Furthermore 
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the reservations of Van der Brug and colleagues to handle the vote choice in a 
multiparty system as a dichotomy government versus opposition support might be a 
little bit exaggerated. As is showed in the literature review, the results of studies on the 
effect of institutional complexity on economic voting showed that, when controlled for 
many other variables, even in multi party systems economic voting takes place. 
Vorselaars (2009) contributed to the existing literature with her Master Thesis on 
attributing responsibility to government parties in the Dutch case and concluded that 
voters are able to attribute responsibility to government parties and make distinctions 
between the responsibilities of individual coalition parties. All in all these studies 
suggest that simplifying the multi party context is valid. And the final argument for 
sticking to the ordinary dichotomy is that it makes it possible to reflect on the results of 
this study by comparing the results with previous studies on the impact of economic 
evaluations on government support. A new, little used way of conceiving the dependent 
variable would have made this problematic. 
In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Surveys respondents are asked in the post 
election wave after their vote choice. This variable will be handled in the way that a 
vote for a party that was in office the previous years to the election will be seen support 
for the government, and a vote for a party that acted in the opposition will be seen as 
support for the opposition. Furthermore a part of the electorate decided to not cast their 
vote at the elections. It is arguable to handle these non-voters as support for the 
opposition, because these voters did decide to refrain from supporting the government. 
However, for this study these non-voters will be handled as missing cases, because 
sufficient understanding of the considerations of these non-voters is unavailable. In 
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order to conceive the dependent variable the formation of the incumbent governments 
prior to elections need to take in account: 
 
Table 1. Dutch Cabinets (since 1982) 
Elections   Cabinet   Prime Minister   Parties (# seats in Parliament) 
1982  Lubbers I  Ruud Lubbers (CDA)  CDA (45)  VVD (36)   
1986  Lubbers II  Ruud Lubbers (CDA)  CDA (54)  VVD (27)   
1989  Lubbers III  Ruud Lubbers (CDA)  CDA (54)  PvdA (49)   
1994  Kok I (Purple I)  Wim Kok (PvdA)  PvdA (37)  VVD (31)  D66 (24) 
1998  Kok II (Purple II)  Wim Kok (PvdA)  PvdA (45)  VVD (38)  D66 (14) 
2002  Balkenende I  Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA)  CDA (43)  LPF (26)  VVD (24) 
2003  Balkenende II  Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA)  CDA (44)  VVD (28)  D66 (6) 
  Balkenende III*  Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA)  CDA (44)  VVD (28)   
2006  Balkenende IV  Jan Peter Balkenende (CDA)  CDA (41)  PvdA (33)  ChristianUnion (6) 
Source: Parliamentary Documentation Centre 
* = Demisionary Minority Cabinet after the subsequent resignation of Balkenende II, in office until the next elections. 
 
 
An example: Every respondent in the election survey for 1986 that voted for either the 
ChristianDemocrats (CDA) or the Liberals (VVD) will be coded as support for the 
government, because the CDA and the VVD were in a government coalition together 
from 1982 to 1986, prior to the elections. For the election in 2002 a vote for the PvdA, 
the VVD or D66 will be handled as government support and any other vote as support 
for opposition parties. The sample distribution of the recoded variable government 
support is as followed: 
 
Table 2. Sample distribution vote for government or opposition (1986-2006) 
  
  1986   1989   1994   1998   2002   2003   2006 
   Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq 
Government Parties  613  646  620  1029  567  562  957 
  48,9%  46,6%  44,5%  63,1%  37,4%  46,6%  43,1% 
Opposition Parties  641  740  773  601  950  1261  794 
  51,1%  53,4%  55,5%  36,9%  62,6%  53,4%  56,9% 
               
Missing  375  368  419  471  390  66  405 
               
N (without missing cases)   1254   1386   1393   1630   1517   1205   2218 
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Source: DPES 1986 - 2006 
 
We can see that, except for the elections in 1998, at every election a majority of the 
respondents voted for an opposition party over a government party. In 2002 62,6% of 
the respondents voted for an opposition party. This is reflected in the election result of 
2002, where the three parties in the previous government lost together a historically 
amount of 41 of their 97 seats in the Parliament. 
 
7.2 Independent Variable: Economic Evaluations 
The most important independent variable in this study is the economic evaluation of the 
individual. Target is the object of evaluation, both the evaluation of the government’s 
performance on the personal economic situation of the voter, as the performance of the 
government on the national economic situation. Respondents in the Dutch 
Parliamentary Election Surveys are asked after their national and personal economic 
conditions, by answering the question do you think that the economic situation has been 
influenced favorably, unfavorably or neither by the government policies? and do you 
think your personal financial situation has been influenced favorably, unfavorably or 
neither by the government policies? Although not discussed in the literature review, 
note that the investigators of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Surveys explicitly refer 
to government policies in the question. Scholars have not agreed yet on the question 
whether government policies actually matter, or just the outcomes of policies. Drawing 
on the literature it would be expected that individuals with better evaluations of their 
personal economic situation and the national economic situation are more likely to 
support the government. It applies the key argument of Fiorina, who came up with the 
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retrospective economic voter hypothesis of “an electorate that treats elections … as 
referenda on the incumbent administration’s handling of the economy” (1981: 26). Two 
other relevant questions are asked in the Dutch Parliamentary Election Surveys and will 
be incorporated in this study as well. Next to the evaluation of the respondent on the 
effect of the government’s performance on the national and personal economic 
situations, respondents are asked on their evaluation of the effect on the employment. 
The question in the survey is: do you think that employment in the Netherlands has been 
influenced favorably, unfavorably, or neither by the government policies? In the 
analysis this question will be handled as an indicator for sociotropic voting, because 
factors as stable prices and employment belong to the macro-economy and therefore to 
sociotropic voting. 
Finally respondents are asked how satisfied they are in general with what the 
government has done during the period prior to the elections. At first sight, this question 
seems not to ask respondents about their evaluation of economic policies. However, the 
fact that this question is asked directly after the three questions on national economic 
situation, employment and personal economic situation, and the fact that social-
economic policy is often the most important part of government policy, it is likely that 
respondents will think of economic aspects while answering this question. (Pellikaan, 
1987: 116) 
The questions on the evaluations of the government’s performance on the national 
economic situation, employment and personal economic situation were not asked in the 
post election wave of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey of 2003. In analyzing 
the elections of 2003 only the general satisfaction can be taken as predictor for 
government support. However, one of the arguments for treating this question as a 
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measure for economic evaluations is invalid, because no questions about economic 
performance were asked prior to this question. This has to be considered when 
interpreting the analyses of the election of 2003. 
Table 3a. Sample Distribution Effect Government on Economic Situation (1986-2006) 
  
  1986   1989   1994   1998   2002   2003   2006 
   Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq 
Unfavorably (1)  246  192  586  162  205    552 
  16,7%  11,4%  36,2%  8,0%  11,0%    21,7% 
The same (2)  381  568  782  645  674    844 
  25,9%  33,6%  48,3%  32,0%  36,2%    33,2% 
Favorably (3)  842  929  252  1209  985    1145 
  57,3%  55,0%  15,6%  60,0%  52,8%    45,1% 
               
Mean  2,41  2,44  1,79  2,52  2,42    2,23 
Standard Deviation  0,76  0,69  0,69  0,64  0,68    0,78 
               
N   1469   1689   1620   2016   1864       2541 
Source: DPES 1986 - 2006 
 
Table 3b. Sample Distribution Effect Government on Employment (1986-2006) 
  
  1986   1989   1994   1998   2002   2003   2006 
   Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq 
Unfavorably (1)  350  484  976  241  186    524 
  23,0%  28,8%  57,3%  11,8%  10,0%    21,0% 
The same (2)  572  623  575  500  422    850 
  37,6%  37,1%  33,8%  24,5%  22,6%    34,1% 
Favorably (3)  600  572  151  1303  1259    1120 
  39,4%  34,1%  8,9%  63,7%  67,4%    44,9% 
               
Mean  2,16  2,05  1,52  2,52  2,57    2,24 
Standard Deviation  0,77  0,79  0,65  0,70  0,67    0,78 
               
N   1522   1679   1702   2044   1867       2494 
Source: DPES 1986 - 2006 
 
Table 3c. Sample Distribution Effect Government on Respondent's Finances (1986-2006) 
  
  1986   1989   1994   1998   2002   2003   2006 
   Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq 
Unfavorably (1)  623  525  664  479  359    1180 
  39,9%  30,5%  38,3%  23,2%  19,1%    46,3% 
The same (2)  748  826  832  1031  857    1101 
  47,9%  47,9%  48,0%  50,0%  45,7%    43,2% 
Favorably (3)  189  372  236  552  660    270 
  12,1%  21,6%  13,6%  26,8%  35,2%    10,6% 
               
Mean  1,72  1,91  1,75  2,04  2,16    1,64 
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Standard Deviation  0,67  0,71  0,68  0,71  0,72    0,66 
               
N   1560   1723   1732   2062   1876       2551 
Source: DPES 1986 - 2006 
 
Table 3d. Sample Distribution General Satisfaction with Government (1986-2006) 
  
  1986   1989   1994   1998   2002   2003   2006 
   Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq  Freq 
Very Unsatisfied (1)  99  111  72  29  59  156  156 
  6,2%  6,4%  4,1%  1,4%  3,1%  12,6%  6,0% 
Dissatisfied (2)  360  285  489  240  366  492  615 
  22,6%  16,4%  27,6%  11,6%  19,3%  39,6%  23,7% 
Satisfied nor unsatisfied (3)  488  722  883  864  818  424  981 
  30,6%  41,6%  49,9%  41,8%  43,1%  34,1%  37,9% 
Satisfied (4)  599  566  324  912  637  162  818 
  37,6%  32,6%  18,3%  44,1%  33,6%  13,0%  31,6% 
Very satisfied (5)  47  53  2  22  16  8  21 
  3,0%  3,1%  0,1%  1,1%  0,8%  0,6%  0,8% 
               
Mean  3,08  3,10  2,83  3,32  3,10  2,50  2,97 
Standard Deviation  0,98  0,93  0,77  0,74  0,82  0,90  0,91 
               
N   1593   1737   1770   2067   1896   1242   2591 
Source: DPES 1986 - 2006 
 
The coding and distribution of the four variables are showed in the above tables. A few 
observations can be made. The first observation is that at the elections of 1994 the 
governments performance on all three targets is evaluated the most negative in relation 
to evaluations at other elections. The second observation is that the respondents are 
quite positive about the effect of the government on the national economic condition. 
Except for the elections of 1994, at all other elections a big majority evaluated the effect 
as favorably or at least the same. A third observation is that the effect on the national 
economic situation is evaluated more positively than the effect on the personal 
economic condition. A fourth observation will be that at most elections more 
respondents evaluated the effect of the government on their personal economic situation 
as unfavorably than favorably. And a final observation is that for the most elections a 
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clear trend is observable for every question. The means for the elections of 1994 were 
all more negative than they were in 1989. In 1998 all aspects were evaluated more 
positively and in 2006 all aspects were evaluated more negatively than in 2002 or 2003. 
In 1989 only the effect on employment was evaluated more negative and in 2002 the 
effects on the national economic situation and general satisfaction were evaluated more 
negative, while the effect on employment and personal economic situation were 
evaluated more positive, but the differences are small. All in all it is observable that in 
relation to the scores of the other elections, the government is judged more negatively at 
the elections of 1994, 2006 and 1986 and more positively at the elections of 1998 and 
2002. 
This rises the question to what extent these four variables are correlated with each 
other, in other words to what extent they measure the same phenomenon. 
Table 4. Correlations Economic Evaluations 
    
National   Personal General 
    Economic Situation Employment Economic Situation Satisfaction 
National Economic Pearson's R 1 ,538 ,265 ,504 
Situation Significance   ,000 ,000 ,000 
  N 11199 10885 11003 11114 
Employment Pearson's R ,538 1 ,275 ,430 
 Significance ,000   ,000 ,000 
 N 10885 11308 11094 11200 
Personal Economic Pearson's R ,265 ,275 1 ,334 
Situation Significance ,000 ,000   ,000 
  N 11003 11094 11504 11377 
General Satisfaction Pearson's R ,504 ,430 ,334 1 
 Significance ,000 ,000 ,000  
  N 11114 11200 11377 12896 
It is observed that all four variables have a certain degree of coherence. The assumption 
that the question about general satisfaction with the government would be related to 
social-economic policies is hereby confirmed, because it is significantly correlated to 
the three other questions. Moreover, it is observed that the personal economic situation 
is significantly correlated to the other three questions, but the degree of coherence is 
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smaller than the coherence of the other three variables together. This can be seen as 
confirmation of the choice to distinct between national and personal economic 
situations. The relationships between the different four variables are not that high that 
multicollinearity exists. 
 
7.3 Control Variables 
This study relies on the Michigan Framework to explain vote choice. An important 
conclusion of Thomassen (2005) is that, although short-term factors gradually become 
more powerful as explanatory factors of voting behavior, you need to control for the 
preceding sets of variables. In order to assess the impact of retrospective judgments of 
the economy on government support it is needed to control for other important factors 
in the model. In line with the Michigan framework and existing literature on the 
predictors for vote choice in the Netherlands the next variables will be incorporated in 
the model to be able to make a valid judgment on the explanatory power of economic 
evaluations. 
7.3.1 Socio-demographic features 
According to Campbell and colleagues the social background of voters will affect the 
voting behavior. The existing studies on explaining government support in the 
Netherlands do not provide an unambiguous answer how socio-demographic features 
affect the likelihood for a vote on one of the government parties. Therefore the study 
done by Listhaug (2005) on government support will be taken as example. Furthermore 
the socio-demographic features will be coded on the basis of conventional wisdom. The 
following socio-demographic features will be incorporated: 
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Age. Based on the study by Listhaug, it can be expected that elderly people are more 
intended to vote for a government party than young people. All respondents are divided 
in 13 categories, ranging from 17 to 20 years (codes as 1), 20 to 25 years (coded as 2) to 
70 to 75 (codes as 12) and 76 and higher ages (coded as 13).   
Sex. Based on the study by Listhaug, it can be expected that if a voter is male he is more 
likely to vote for a government party. The female gender is codes as 0, the male gender 
is coded as 1. 
Social Class. Based on the study by Listhaug, it can be expected that when voters assign 
themselves to a higher social class they are more likely to vote for a government party. 
Respondents could assign themselves to five different categories: working class (coded 
as 1), upper working class, middle class, upper middle class and upper class (coded as 
5). 
Religion. Based on the study by Listhaug, it can be expected that people who often 
attend a religious service are more likely to vote for a government party. Respondents 
were asked to indicate how often they attend a religious service, ranging from (almost) 
never (coded as 1) to at least once a week (coded as 5).  
Education. It can be expected that a higher educated respondent is more likely to 
support the government. Respondents were asked to indicate what the highest education 
level is they completed, ranging from elementary education (coded as 1) to higher 
vocational, or university level (coded as 5). 
 
7.3.2 Long-term predispositions: Party Identification 
In the Michigan framework party identification has the function of ensuring people’s 
lasting attachment to a political party. It is the long-term, affective, psychological 
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identification with one’s preferred party. Problematic with using party identification as 
an explanatory factor of voting behavior is that it seems that party identification and 
party choice tend to coincide and change in tandem. In a small study to examine the 
coincidence of party identification and party choice Berglund and colleagues (2005: 
124) found that six in seven people vote for the party that they identify with. This makes 
party identification very problematic as a predictor for vote choice, because it seems 
that they are too related to each other. However, adding a strength or intensity 
component to party identification is not controversial among scholars. “There seems to 
be a general agreement that a variable measuring degree of party attachment is quite 
useful, no matter how we interpret party identification.” (Holmberg, 1994: 101) 
In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Surveys respondents are asked if they feel 
adherent to a political party, and if so to which party they feel adherent. Furthermore 
respondents are asked if they feel attracted to a political party, and if so to which party 
they feel attracted. These questions can be combined into one scale, ranging from 
neither adherent nor attracted to a political party (coded as 0), to very convinced 
adherent to a political party (coded as 7). In order to use party identification as an 
indicator for government support, in this study this scale is used in combination with the 
direction of the scale. For respondents that answered that their party adherence is 
directed at one of the opposition parties, the scale is inverted to a scale ranging from 
very convinced adherent to a opposition party (coded as -7), to no adherent to a 
opposition party, but attracted to a opposition party (coded as -2). Respondents who 
answered that their party adherence is directed at one of the government parties kept 
their score on the already existing scale. In this way a variable for party identification is 
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developed ranging from very convinced adherent to a opposition party (coded as -7) to 
very convinced adherent to a government party (coded as 7). 
 
7.3.3 Long-term predispositions: Ideological Orientation 
According Van der Eijk en colleagues “the left-right continuum has traditionally been 
looked upon in electoral research as one of the most important dimensions to describe 
voters’ substantive political orientations. In combination with their perceptions of where 
the political parties are located on the same dimension, these orientations allow an 
instrumental mode of electoral choice.” (2005: 167) They describe that left-right 
orientations of citizens are one of the most important factors that determine vote choice. 
The left-right orientation also structures other political orientations, such as 
considerations about political issues, government performance and political leaders. 
Van der Eijk and colleagues conclude that in the Netherlands a strong association exist 
between the left-right position and party choice, and that this association remains 
observable, even though the strength can vary over time. 
Therefore, it can be expected that a voters position on the left-right continuum has 
explanatory power for the vote choice, based on the idea that the position of the party in 
the same continuum should match. The distance between the self-placement of the voter 
and the position of the party can be an indicator of how likely it is that a voter will cast 
his vote for that party. This idea is neglected by Listhaug (2005) in her study on the vote 
for the incumbent parties. She does not work with left-right distance, but takes only the 
position of the respondent on the left-right dimension. This does not make sense 
because it implies that a higher score on the left-right dimension (ergo a more right 
orientation) would increase the likelihood of voting on an incumbent party. 
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Problematic in using left-right distance as a predictor for government support is 
that you need to combine the positions of all government parties in order to measure the 
distance of the self-placement with the position of the government in the left-right 
continuum. In this study the average score of the positions of the coalition parties will 
be used as the position of the government in the left-right continuum, with the side note 
that this is quite artificial and that it might not be a correct reflection of the true position 
of the government. It might not be the correct reflection, but a better alternative is 
unavailable. 
The distance between self-placement and the average score of the government 
parties will be made absolute, because it does not matter in what direction the distance 
between the positions appear. Furthermore the distance will be inverted, in order to 
make sure that the variable aligns with direction in which the dependent variable is 
coded and that a higher score reflects an agreement between the self-placement and the 
placement of the government. 
For example if a respondent at the elections of 1986 placed himself on a scale 
from 0 to 10 at number 3, and the coalition parties the CDA and VVD respectively at 
number 6 and 8, the distance will be coded as 6 (average score for government parties is 
7, distance between self-placement and average is 4, inverted to number 6). If a 
respondent at the elections of 2002 placed himself at 8 and the coalition parties the 
PvdA, VVD and D66 respectively an 3, an 8 and an 5, the distance will be coded as 
7,33 (distance between self-placement and government average is -2,67, this will be 
made absolute to 2,67 and subsequently inverted to 7,33). All in all a scale is developed 
ranging from 0 (what reflects a very big distance between the self-placement and the 
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government placement) to 10 (what reflects a total agreement between the self-
placement and the government placement). 
 
7.3.3 Short-term factors: Sympathy score Party Leaders 
Many scholars who studied the Dutch elections observed a relationship between de 
popularity of the candidate of a party and its success. The support for the government 
can therefore possibly be explained by the sympathy an individual has for the party 
leaders of the government parties. It can be expected that a respondent with a higher 
level of sympathy is more likely to vote for the government. Every respondent is asked 
to indicate how sympathetic they find the politicians on a scale of 0 (very 
unsympathetic) to 10 (very sympathetic). Because the dependent variable in this study is 
the support for the previous government as a whole the mean of the sympathy scores of 
the party leaders of the government parties will be taken as measure for the sympathy 
score for the party leaders. This can be problematic, because it is not obvious that an 
individual has the same sympathy feelings for every party leader in the government, but 
no concrete alternative is available. 
 
7.3.5 Short-term factors: Faith in Prime Minister 
In the literature there is often referred to the so called Prime Minister bonus, what refers 
to the benefit of the party of the Prime Minister from the status and achievements of the 
previous Prime Minister. This can influence the electoral outcomes and can therefore 
explain the electoral choices of citizens, and therefore needs to be incorporated as short-
term factor in the statistical model. Respondents in the Dutch Parliamentary Election 
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Surveys are asked the question How much faith do you have in <previous Prime 
Minister> as Prime Minister? Respondents can answer this question on a scale from 1 
(very much faith) to 7 (no faith at all). For this research design the respondents faith in 
the Prime Minister or his successor in his own party will be used as variable in 
explaining voting for the government or opposition. For example in 1989 Ruud Lubbers 
was the Prime Minister in office and the candidate of the CDA in the elections, so 
respondents were asked to indicate their faith in Ruud Lubbers as Prime Minister. In 
1994 Ruud Lubbers was succeeded by Elco Brinkman as party leader, so respondents 
were asked to indicate their faith in Elco Brinkman as Prime Minister. 
We expect that respondents with more faith in the Prime Minister are more likely to 
vote for the government, so the variable is recoded in order to align it with the direction 
of the dependent variable (very much faith is coded as 7, no faith at all is codes as 1). 
 
8. Empirical Results 
Before diving into the regression analyes it is advisable to take a look at how the main 
variables, government support and the economic evaluations, are related to each other.  
 
Table 5a. Effect government policy on National Economic Situation 
    
  1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2006 
Unfavorably Voted for Opposition  160 128 290 67 134 364 
   87,0% 87,1% 67,3% 60,4% 80,7% 82,4% 
 Voted for Government  24 19 141 44 32 78 
   13,0% 12,9% 32,7% 39,6% 19,3% 17,6% 
Favorably nor Voted for Opposition   213 287 349 207 360 481 
Unfavorably   77,5% 68,2% 54,5% 42,9% 68,8% 68,6% 
 Voted for Government  62 134 291 276 163 220 
      22,5% 31,8% 45,5% 57,1% 31,2% 31,4% 
Favorably Voted for Opposition  204 303 75 305 433 381 
   29,5% 38,7% 36,2% 30,7% 54,2% 37,1% 
 Voted for Government  487 480 132 688 366 646 
   70,5% 61,3% 63,8% 69,3% 45,8% 62,9% 
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Source: DPES 1986 - 2006 
 
Table 5b. Effect government policy on Employment 
    
  1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2006 
Unfavorably Voted for Opposition  221 302 468 73 117 339 
   82,2% 82,5% 63,8% 44,5% 79,1% 81,7% 
 Voted for Government  48 64 266 91 31 76 
   17,8% 17,5% 36,2% 55,5% 20,9% 18,3% 
Favorably nor Voted for Opposition   277 262 230 169 237 474 
Unfavorably   64,9% 52,0% 49,4% 43,7% 73,4% 64,5% 
 Voted for Government  150 242 236 218 86 261 
      35,1% 48,0% 50,6% 56,3% 26,6% 35,5% 
Favorably Voted for Opposition  105 154 46 339 577 378 
   21,7% 33,3% 38,3% 32,3% 56,7% 38,7% 
 Voted for Government  379 309 74 709 441 598 
   78,3% 66,7% 61,7% 67,7% 43,3% 61,3% 
Source: DPES 1986 - 2006 
 
Table 5c. Effect government policy on Respondents Finances 
    
  1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2006 
Unfavorably Voted for Opposition  295 291 317 170 206 681 
   63,2% 69,0% 63,3% 45,9% 72,5% 69,1% 
 Voted for Government  172 131 184 200 78 304 
   36,8% 31,0% 36,7% 54,1% 27,5% 30,9% 
Favorably nor Voted for Opposition   272 333 349 286 452 453 
Unfavorably   46,8% 51,9% 52,4% 35,8% 66,3% 47,6% 
 Voted for Government  309 309 317 513 230 499 
      53,2% 48,1% 47,6% 64,2% 33,7% 52,4% 
Favorably Voted for Opposition  48 108 81 139 281 92 
   31,6% 35,8% 46,3% 31,7% 53,2% 40,0% 
 Voted for Government  104 194 94 299 247 138 
   68,4% 64,2% 53,7% 68,3% 46,8% 60,0% 
Source: DPES 1986 - 2006 
 
Table 5d. Effect government policy on General Satisfaction 
    
  1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006 
Very unsatisfied Voted for Opposition  72 78 41 15 44 110 120 
   94,7% 92,9% 80,4% 75,0% 91,7% 75,9% 96,8% 
 Voted for Government  4 6 10 5 4 35 4 
   5,3% 7,1% 19,6% 25,0% 8,3% 24,1% 3,2% 
Dissatisfied Voted for Opposition   246 207 267 99 247 308 438 
   90,4% 93,2% 71,2% 56,3% 86,1% 66,5% 82,6% 
 Voted for Government  26 15 108 77 40 155 92 
      9,6% 6,8% 28,8% 43,8% 13,9% 33,5% 17,4% 
Satisfied Voted for Opposition   214 343 361 285 409 169 476 
nor Unsatisfied   60,1% 61,3% 52,8% 43,8% 63,1% 41,6% 58,4% 
46 
 
 Voted for Government  142 217 323 365 239 237 339 
      39,9% 38,8% 47,2% 56,2% 36,9% 58,4% 41,6% 
Satisfied Voted for Opposition   97 105 94 195 238 37 216 
   19,7% 22,4% 35,9% 25,9% 46,6% 23,6% 30,1% 
 Voted for Government  396 364 168 557 273 120 501 
      80,3% 77,6% 64,1% 74,1% 53,4% 76,4% 69,9% 
Very satisfied Voted for Opposition  2 3 0 1 6 1 3 
   5,0% 6,8% 0,0% 5,9% 40,0% 12,5% 15,0% 
 Voted for Government  38 41 1 16 9 7 17 
   95,0% 93,2% 100,0% 94,1% 60,0% 87,5% 85,0% 
Source: DPES 1986 - 2006 
 
A simple bivariate table points in the direction that the claim that more positive 
evaluations increases the likelihood for government support makes sense, also in the 
Dutch case and for election after election. These bivariate tables make it possible to 
compare the ratio between government supporters and opposition supporters for 
different evaluations on the four economic variables.  
It can be observed that for every variable for every election the ratio between 
government and opposition supporters shift from a majority of opposition supporters to 
a majority of government supporters when the evaluations become more positively. For 
example, 87,0% of the respondents who evaluated the effect of the government on the 
national economic situation in 1986 as unfavorably voted for the opposition, while only 
29,5% of the respondents who evaluated the effect favorably voted for the opposition. 
The only exception for this observation is the election of 2002, where in almost every 
group of respondents a majority of opposition supports exist. This can be explained by 
huge loss of support the government parties faced in these elections. However ratio’s 
for these elections move in the same direction as they do at other elections. Based on 
these tables you can state that a more positive evaluation on all four variables is related 
to a higher likelihood of voting for the government.  
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Although, these bivariate tables does not provide any information about the strength and 
direction of these relationship. It points to the questions that need to answered: How 
important are these evaluations for the voting behavior of individuals, once other 
variables are controlled for? A regression analysis will be performed to answer this 
question. 
 
8.1 Regression Analyses 
For every election a direct logistic regression is performed in on order to assess the 
impact of economic evaluations on the likelihood that the respondent will support the 
government. The regression analyses contain two parts. In the first model only the 
economic evaluations are assessed, in the full model all control variables are 
incorporated as well. For every election all variables are checked on multicollinearity 
and none of the variables demonstrated a problematic high correlation with the 
dependent variable or one of the other independent or control variables. The full tables 
of the Logistic Regression Analyses can be found in the Appendix to this thesis. 
8.1.1 The elections of 1986 
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of economic evaluations 
on the likelihood that a respondent would vote for a government party at the elections of 
1986. The model containing only the economic evaluations was statistically significant, 
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who voted for the 
government and voters who voted for the opposition. The model as a whole explained 
between the 29,9% and 41,2% of the variance in government support. As shown only 
the effect of government policies on employment and the general satisfaction with the 
48 
 
government made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model. The 
strongest predictor of government support was general satisfaction, recording an odds 
ratio of 3.396, indicating that respondents who reported that they were satisfied with the 
government were over 3 times more likely to vote for the government. 
The full model was statistically significant as well and explained as a whole 
between 58,3% and 80,5% of the variance. The effect of the government on 
employment remained making a unique statistically significant contribution, with an 
odds ratio of 2.030. Furthermore party adherence, left-right distance, sympathy score for 
party leaders of the government parties and the faith in the prime minister made a 
unique statistically significant contribution to the model, while controlling for other 
factors that might have influenced the government support. 
8.1.2 The elections of 1989 
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of economic evaluations 
on the likelihood that a respondent would vote for a government party at the elections of 
1989. The model containing only the economic evaluations was statistically significant, 
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who voted for the 
government and voters who voted for the opposition. The model as a whole explained 
between the 25,5% and 34,6% of the variance in government support. As shown the 
effect of government policies on the national economic situation and the personal 
economic situation, as well as the general satisfaction with the government made a 
unique statistically significant contribution to the model. The strongest predictor of 
government support was general satisfaction, recording an odds ratio of 3.996, 
indicating that respondents who reported that they were satisfied with the government 
were almost 4 times more likely to vote for the government. 
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The full model was statistically significant as well and explained as a whole 
between 56,0% and 76,0% of the variance. When controlling for other factors that might 
influence government support, only the general satisfaction with the government 
remained statistically significant, with an odds ratio of 2.097. Furthermore gender, party 
adherence, left-right distance and the faith in the prime minister made a unique 
statistically significant contribution to the model, while controlling for other factors that 
might have influenced the government support. 
 
8.1.3 The elections of 1994 
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of economic evaluations 
on the likelihood that a respondent would vote for a government party at the elections of 
1994. The model containing only the economic evaluations was statistically significant, 
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who voted for the 
government and voters who voted for the opposition. The model as a whole explained 
between the 9,6% and 12,8% of the variance in government support. As shown the 
effect of government policies on the national economic situation and the general 
satisfaction with the government made a unique statistically significant contribution to 
the model. The strongest predictor of government support was general satisfaction, 
recording an odds ratio of 1,540, indicating that respondents who reported that they 
were satisfied with the government were about 1,5 times more likely to vote for the 
government. 
The full model was statistically significant as well and explained as a whole 
between 44,8% and 59,9% of the variance. When controlling for other factors that might 
influence government support, none of the economic evaluations remained statistically 
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significant. This is in contrary to age, gender, party adherence, left-right distance, 
sympathy for the party leaders of the government parties and the faith in the prime 
minister, because they all made a unique statistically significant contribution to the 
model, while controlling for other factors that might have influenced the government 
support. Note that these findings are quite in contrary to the findings of Van Holsteyn 
and Irwin (1997) and Kaashoek (1995). They found that evidence that a combination of 
negative evaluations and a decreasing level of party attachment accounted for the big 
loss of the government parties. 
 
8.1.4 The elections of 1998 
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of economic evaluations 
on the likelihood that a respondent would vote for a government party at the elections of 
1998. The model containing only the economic evaluations was statistically significant, 
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who voted for the 
government and voters who voted for the opposition. The model as a whole explained 
between the 4,1% and 5,4% of the variance in government support. As shown the effect 
of government policies on the national economic situation and the general satisfaction 
with the government made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model. 
The strongest predictor of government support was the effect of the government policies 
on the national economic situation, recording an odds ratio of 1,533, indicating that 
respondents who reported that they evaluated the government policies as favorably to 
the national economic situation were about 1,5 times more likely to vote for the 
government. 
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The full model was statistically significant as well and explained as a whole 
between 45,8% and 65,9% of the variance. When controlling for other factors that might 
influence government support, only the general satisfaction remained statistically 
significant. Furthermore, religion and party adherence made all a unique statistically 
significant contribution to the model, while controlling for other factors that might have 
influenced the government support. 
 
8.1.5 The elections of 2002 
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of economic evaluations 
on the likelihood that a respondent would vote for a government party at the elections of 
2002. The model containing only the economic evaluations was statistically significant, 
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who voted for the 
government and voters who voted for the opposition. The model as a whole explained 
between the 8,7% and 12,4% of the variance in government support. As shown the 
effect of government policies on employment and the general satisfaction with the 
government made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model. The 
strongest predictor of government support was general satisfaction with the government, 
recording an odds ratio of 2,115, indicating that respondents who are satisfied with the 
government were over 2 times more likely to vote for the government. 
The full model was statistically significant as well and explained as a whole 
between 45,8% and 65,9% of the variance. When controlling for other factors that might 
influence government support, only the general satisfaction remained statistically 
significant. Furthermore, religion and party adherence made all a unique statistically 
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significant contribution to the model, while controlling for other factors that might have 
influenced the government support. 
 
8.1.6 The elections of 2003 
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of economic evaluations 
on the likelihood that a respondent would vote for a government party at the elections of 
2003. In the Dutch Parliamentary Election Surveys of 2003 the respondents were only 
asked on their general satisfaction. The model containing only this variable was 
statistically significant, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between 
respondents who voted for the government and voters who voted for the opposition. The 
model explained between the 10,7% and 14,4% of the variance in government support. 
As shown the effect of the general satisfaction with the government made a unique 
statistically significant contribution to the model, recording an odds ratio of 2,292, 
indicating that respondents who are satisfied with the government were over 2 times 
more likely to vote for the government. 
The full model was statistically significant as well and explained as a whole 
between 44,2% and 59,5% of the variance. When controlling for other factors that might 
influence government support the general satisfaction remained statistically significant. 
Furthermore, age, social class, left-right distance and sympathy for party leaders made 
all a unique statistically significant contribution to the model, while controlling for other 
factors that might have influenced the government support. Note that party adherence 
and faith prime minister are not incorporated in the model, due to the fact that some 
questions were not asked in the surveys on the election of 2003. 
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8.1.7 The elections of 2006 
Direct logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of economic evaluations 
on the likelihood that a respondent would vote for a government party at the elections of 
2006. The model containing only the economic evaluations was statistically significant, 
indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who voted for the 
government and voters who voted for the opposition. The model as a whole explained 
between the 14,5% and 19,3% of the variance in government support. As shown only 
the general satisfaction with the government made a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model, recording an odds ratio of 1,880, indicating that respondents 
who are satisfied with the government were almost 2 times more likely to vote for the 
government. 
The full model was statistically significant as well and explained as a whole 
between 44,9% and 59,9% of the variance. When controlling for other factors that might 
influence government support, the general satisfaction lost its statistically significance. 
In contrary sex, education, party adherence, left-right distance and faith in the prime 
minister made all a unique statistically significant contribution to the model, while 
controlling for other factors that might have influenced the government support, but 
note that the sympathy scores for party leaders are excluded in this model, because these 
questions were not asked in the DPES of 2006. 
 
8.1.8 One model for the elections of 1986 to 2002 
The pooled data set of the Dutch Parliamentary Election Surveys of 1971 to 2006 
enables to build one model in which no distinction will be made for different elections. 
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It is possible to perform a direct logistic regression for all respondents from 1986 to 
2002 in order to assess the impact of economic evaluations and the control variables on 
government support. The respondents from the elections of 2003 and 2006 are 
excluded, because not all control variables are available for these respondents. The 
model containing only the economic evaluations was statistically significant, indicating 
that the model was able to distinguish between respondents who voted for the 
government and voters who voted for the opposition. The model as a whole explained 
between the 14,7% and 19,6% of the variance in government support. As shown the 
effect of the government on the national economic situation and the general satisfaction 
with the government made a unique statistically significant contribution to the model. 
The strongest predictor of government support was the general satisfaction with the 
government, recording an odds ratio of 2,523, indicating that respondents who are 
satisfied with the government were almost 2,5 times more likely to vote for the 
government. 
The full model was statistically significant as well and explained as a whole 
between 53,4% and 71,3% of the variance. When controlling for other factors that might 
influence government support, both the effect of the government on the national 
economic situation and the general satisfaction of the government remain statistically 
significant. Furthermore sex, religion, party adherence, left-right distance, sympathy for 
party leaders and faith in prime ministers made all a unique statistically significant 
contribution to the model, while controlling for other factors that might have influenced 
the government support. 
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8.1.9 Statistically Significant Contributors to Government Support 
After the performance of the regression analyses at every election it is possible to make 
an overview of what factors made an unique statistically significant contribution to the 
models in order to assess the impact of economic evaluations on government support. 
Without any other control variables it is observable that the degree of general 
satisfaction about what the government has done the years prior to the elections at every 
election made a statistically significant contribution, recording odds ratios ranging from 
1,370 at the elections of 1998 to 3,996 at the elections of 1989. Only at the elections of 
1998 the general satisfaction was not the most powerful predictor for government 
support. The evaluation of the effect of government policies on the national economic 
situation made a statistically significant contribution at the elections of 1989, 1994 and 
1998. Evaluations of the effect of the government policies on employment made a 
statistically significant contribution to the models of the elections of 1986 and 2002. 
That evaluations about employment played a significant role in the elections of 1986 
can be explained by the fact that employment was, according to Aardal and van Wijnen 
(2005: 208), the most important issue in the elections of 1986. Evaluations on the effect 
of government policies on the personal finances of the respondents made a statistically 
significant contribution to the model of 1989, but its odds ratio is rather low (1,254). 
All models appeared to be statistically significant, indicating that every model was able 
to distinguish between respondents who support the government and those who do not. 
The R square appears to be a measure in order to express the explained variance of a 
model. The explained variance of all the models vary from 4,1% at the elections of 1998 
to 29,9% at the elections of 1986 if the Cox & Snell R square is used as measure, or 
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5,4% at the elections of 1998 to 41,2% at the elections of 1986. The results vary 
somewhat and no trend over time is observable. 
When controlling for other variables, such as socio-demographic features, long-term 
predispositions and short-term factors the general satisfaction kept its statistically 
significant contribution to the model at the elections of 1989, 2002 and 2003. The same 
holds for employment at the elections of 1986, where it was the most powerful predictor 
in the model, and the national economic condition at the elections of 1998. All in all we 
can therefore conclude that at the elections of 1986, 1989, 1998, 2002 and 2003 an 
economic evaluation made a statistically significant contribution to the model. At the 
elections of 1994 and 2006 the economic evaluations lost their significance when 
controlling for other variables. 
 
Table 6. Statistically significant contributors to government support 
    
C&S R² 
N 
R² Significant contributors (odds ratio) 
1986 Only economic evaluations ,299 ,412 Employment (2,153); General Satisfaction (3,396) 
  All variables ,583 ,805 
Employment (2,030); Party Adherence (1,956), Left-Right 
Distance (1,582), Sympathy Party Leaders (1,530), Faith Prime 
Minister (1,273) 
1989 Only economic evaluations ,255 ,346 
National Economic Situation (1,544); Personal Economic 
Situation (1,254), General Satisfaction (3,996) 
  All variables ,560 ,760 
General Satisfaction (2,097); Sex (0,346); Party Adherence 
(1,811); Left-Right Distance (1,814); Faith Prime Minister 
(1,680) 
1994 Only economic evaluations ,096 ,128 
National Economic Situation (1,400); General Satisfaction 
(1,540) 
  All variables ,448 ,599 
Age (1,099); Sex (0,580); Party Adherence (1,670); Left-Right 
Distance (1,243); Sympathy Party Leaders (1,190); Faith Prime 
Minister (1,231) 
1998 Only economic evaluations ,041 ,054 
National Economic Situation (1,533); General Satisfaction 
(1,370) 
  All variables ,538 ,717 
National Economic Situation (1,619); Sex (0,468); Religion 
(0,649); Party Adherence (2,088); Faith Prime Minister (1,334) 
2002 Only economic evaluations ,087 ,124 Employment (1,429); General Satisfaction (2,115) 
  All variables ,458 ,659 
General Satisfaction (1,654); Religion (0,818); Party 
Adherence (1,800) 
2003* Only economic evaluations ,107 ,144 General Satisfaction (2.292) 
  All variables ,442 ,595 
General Satisfaction (1,434); Social Class (1,510); Left-Right 
Distance (2,433); Sympathy Party Leaders (1,867) 
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2006** Only economic evaluations ,145 ,193 General Satisfaction (1,880) 
  All variables ,449 ,599 
Sex (0,384); Education (1,689); Party Adherence (1,871); Left-
Right Distance (1,474); Faith Prime Minister (1,481) 
1986-
2002 Only economic evaluations ,147 ,196 
National Economic Situation (1,387); General Satisfaction 
(2,523) 
 All variables ,534 ,713 
National Economic Situation (1,267); General Satisfaction 
(1,270); Sex (0,646); Religion (0,927); Party Adherence 
(1,895); Left-Right Distance (1,312); Sympathy Party Leaders 
(1,244); Faith Prime Minister (1,310) 
* = National Economic Situation, Employment, Personal Economic Situation, Party Adherence and Faith Prime Minister 
not included in model 
** = Sympathy Party leaders not included in model 
 
It is not striking to observe that most of the variables derived from the Michigan 
framework made a statistically significant contribution to the model. Party Adherence is 
significant in every model, reporting odds ratios ranging from 1,670 to 2,088. It is the 
most powerful predictor at the elections, except for the elections of 1986 and 1989 
where it is outperformed by employment and general satisfaction. Religion made a 
unique statistically significant contribution at the elections of 1998 and 2002. At 
hindsight this might be explained by the fact that none of the coalition parties of these 
cabinets were based on religious grounds. Therefore, it makes sense that voters who are 
not willing to attend religious services are more likely to vote for the government. 
Gender seems to be a predictor for government support as well, recording that being a 
female makes it more likely to vote for a government party. All models were 
statistically significant and recorded quite high R squares, indicating that the models 
explained often around 50% of the variance or more. 
The factors that played a role in explaining government support vary quite a lot from 
election to election, which indicates that there need to be dealed with very different 
contexts. This makes using the pooled model for the elections of 1986 to 2002 as a valid 
model for explaining government support problematic. The observed significant factors 
in this model are the product of the significant contribution they made at single 
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elections. The models per election are therefore more valid and contain more 
information about the relation between economic evaluations and government support. 
 
8.1.10 Evaluating the hypotheses 
The formulated hypotheses, in order to provide a good insight in the relation between 
the economy and electoral outcomes, can be tested on basis of the analyses that are 
done. 
 
H1a: Voters with a positive (negative) evaluation of the government’s performance on 
the national economic conditions are more (less) likely to support the government. 
According to the logistic regression analyses, evaluations about the national economic 
situation or the employment made a unique statistically significant contribution at the 
elections of 1986 and 1998. Furthermore general satisfaction about the governments 
performance made a unique statistically significant contribution at the elections of 1989, 
2002 and 2003. In this thesis it is argued that the general satisfaction will be handled as 
a measure for economic evaluations. However carefull interpretation is needed, because 
at the elections of 2003 no economic question were asked prior to the question about the 
general satisfaction. These results point in the direction that sociotropic voting occurs in 
the case of the Netherlands, at least at some elections. The results of the regression 
analyses for 5 out of 7 elections show that voters with a more positive evaluation about 
the government are more likely to vote for the government. With some reluctance we 
can consider Hypothesis 1a to be confirmed, at least for the elections of 1986, 1989, 
1998, 2002 and 2003. 
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H1b: Voters with a positive (negative) evaluation of the government’s performance on 
their personal economic conditions are more (less) likely to support the government. 
Evaluations about the effect of government policies on the respondents personal 
finances seem to make no unique statistically significant contribution at any election. In 
this analysis no indication for pocketbook voting is found and therefore Hypothesis 1b 
can be rejected. 
 
H2: The impact of a positive evaluation of the government’s performance on national 
economic conditions on the likelihood for government support is greater than the 
impact of a positive evaluation of the government performance on personal economic 
conditions on the likelihood for government support. 
No indication for pocketbook voting is found in this study in contrary to some findings 
that points in the direction that sociotropic voting exists. Therefore it can be stated that 
evaluations of the national economic situation outperformed evaluations of the personal 
economic situation. Hypothesis 2 can therefore be seen as corroborated. 
H3: The impact of a positive evaluation of the government’s performance on national 
(personal) economic conditions on the likelihood for government support increases 
over time. 
It was expected that economic evaluations should be of increasing importance in 
explaining the government support over time. For the elections in which economic 
evaluations made a significant contribution we can observe that Employment in 1986 
and General Satisfaction in 1989 are stronger predictors for Government Support in 
these elections than the economic evaluations in the elections of 1998, 2002 and 2003. 
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This is in contrast to what was expected. No results were found that point in the 
direction of our formulated expectation, so Hypothesis 3 needs to be rejected. 
 
H4: The impact of a positive evaluation of the government’s performance on national 
(personal) economic conditions on the likelihood for government support increases 
when in general the evaluations of the government’s performance are more negative. 
The economic variables for the elections of 1994 and 2006 were evaluated in general 
the most negative when comparing them to the economic variables at other elections. It 
is striking that at these elections none of the economic variables made a unique 
statistically significant contribution to the explanation of government support. Therefore 
no evidence is found that in times were the economy is evaluated more negative the 
impact of the economic evaluations on the likelihood for government support increases. 
Hypothesis 4 needs to be rejected. 
 
9. Conclusion and Discussion 
After the analyses it is possible to draw some conclusions and provide a final answer on 
what the research question was of this thesis: What is the impact of a voter’s evaluation 
of national and personal economic conditions on his likelihood for supporting the 
government at the elections in The Netherlands? In general it can be stated that a more 
positive evaluation of the national economic conditions increases the likelihood that a 
voter will support the government at the next elections in the Netherlands. This 
translation from a positive evaluation of the economic condition to a vote for the 
government is the effect of the attribution of responsibility for this positive economic 
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situation to the incumbent government parties. Because the voter believes that these 
incumbent parties are more or less responsible for the flourishing economic state he or 
she is more likely to reward the government parties with a vote at the next elections. 
The conclusion that a more positive evaluation of the personal economic conditions will 
increase the likelihood that a voter will vote for the government is untenable. The 
existing literature on pocketbook voting suggests that voters do not attribute 
responsibility to the government parties for their personal finances. For the Dutch case 
no evidence is found that voters translate their evaluation of their financial well-being 
into a vote for or against the government. 
The strength of the impact of the evaluations of the national economic situation on 
government support is partially explained by other factors that have an impact on voting 
behavior. This study has shown that the impact of economic evaluations on government 
support decreases or even disappears for some targets in some elections when traditional 
voting predictors as party identification, ideological orientation and positions on party 
leaders are also included in the analysis. According to the Michigan Framework it is not 
surprisingly that a voters position on economic evaluations is influenced by the level of 
identification with a government party or his ideological orientation. 
However, it is striking to see that the strength of the impact of the economic evaluations 
on government support is not consistent over time. The strength of the impact of 
economic evaluations on government support varies per election. Furthermore for every 
election it differs which economic evaluation made a statistically significant 
contribution to the government support. This suggests that a differentiation in the target 
of economic evaluations of the national economic situation can be helpful for further 
research. 
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On the basis of the results of this study it is impossible to draw conclusions why 
economic evaluations matter more in some elections than in other. No evidence is found 
that the level of economic voting increases, due to changes in the composition of the 
electorate and the relationship between social structure and electoral behavior, as 
suggested by Thomassen (2005). In addition, no evidence is found that economic 
evaluations matter more at elections where the government performance on the 
economy is evaluated more negatively. A possible explanation for the differences 
between the elections can be that it matters how important the economy is as issue prior 
to the election. This could explain why in 1986 the evaluations on the employment 
made a statistically significant contribution, and why in 1998 and 2002 the economic 
evaluations had almost no impact on the support for the government. The most 
important issue in 1986 was employment and in 1998 and 2002 were dominated by 
issues as minority groups, law and order and the islam. 
The final conclusion is therefore that economic evaluations can have an impact on the 
electoral outcomes in the Netherlands, but it can vary from election to election. It can be 
expected that the elections in September 2012 are all about the economy. The support 
for the government can be influenced by the evaluations of voters on the economic 
situation in the Netherlands. When most voters consider the economic situation as more 
negative than before this might decrease the support for the government. From that 
perspective it might be wise for opposition leaders to ask voters: Is the economy better 
off than before? 
 
63 
 
9.1 Future Research 
The biggest question that popped up at this study is: Why do economic evaluations in 
some elections matter, while in other elections economic evaluations seem to have no 
impact on the electoral outcomes? Future research needs to address this research 
question. Furthermore this study has found that it varies per election which economic 
evaluations have an impact on the electoral outcomes. It might be interesting to see 
whether it is possible to differentiate between different objects of evaluations, and how 
these observations contribute to a general economic evaluation. As far as known this 
question is unanswered yet and need, also according to Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
(2007), attention.  
 
9.2 Discussion 
This study simplified the Dutch multiparty system to a dichotomy of government 
support versus opposition support. Although the choice for this simplification is 
substantiated in the research design, it had an effect on almost every control variable. 
Party identification is related to one specific party and not to the government or 
opposition as a whole. The same holds for the left-right distance (the position of the 
government was an artifact) and the sympathy scores for the leaders (the sympathy 
scores can vary a lot between different coalition party leaders). All in all this can have 
lead to a model that does not adequately reflect the Dutch case, but a better alternative is 
unavailable. 
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Appendixes 
 
1. Tables Logistic Regression Analyses 
 
1.1 Elections of 1986 
 
Table 7a. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting for Government at 
Elections in 1986 
 
 B S.E. Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95,0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
 
     Lower Upper 
National Economic Situation  0,311 0,204 2,329 1,365 0,915 2,034 
Employment  0,767*** 0,181 17,887 2,153 1,509 3,072 
Personal Economic Situation  -0,210 0,183 1,323 0,811 0,567 1,159 
General Satisfaction  1,223*** 0,179 46,726 3,396 2,392 4,822 
Constant  -5,736*** 0,646 78,802 0,003   
        
N  506 
-2 log likelihood  473,139 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,299 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,412 
χ² (d.f.)   179,438 (6) 
National Economic Situation  0,111 0,366 0,092 1,117 0,545 2,290 
Employment  0,708** 0,291 5,903 2,030 1,147 3,593 
Personal Economic Situation  -0,227 0,299 0,574 0,797 0,443 1,433 
General Satisfaction  0,053 0,317 0,28 1,055 0,566 1,964 
Age  -0,004 0,0598 0,004 0,996 0,888 1,117 
Sex  0,007 0,38 0 1,007 0,478 2,119 
Social Class  0,202 0,214 0,893 1,224 0,805 1,860 
Religion  0,021 0,122 0,028 1,021 0,803 1,297 
Education  -0,203 0,17 1,424 0,816 0,585 1,139 
Party Adherence  0,671*** 0,077 75,451 1,956 1,681 2,276 
Left-Right Distance  0,459*** 0,124 13,747 1,582 1,241 2,016 
Sympathy Party Leaders  0,425** 0,13 10,681 1,530 1,186 1,975 
Faith Prime Minister  0,242* 0,138 3,083 1,273 0,972 1,668 
Constant  
-
8,433*** 1,585 28,304 0,000   
        
N  506 
-2 log likelihood  209,978 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,583 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,805 
χ² (d.f.)   442,600 (13) 
* = sig at .05 level; ** =  sig at .01 level; *** = sig at .001 level 
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1.2 Elections of 1989 
Table 7b. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting for Government at 
Elections in 1989 
 
 B S.E. Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95,0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
 
     Lower Upper 
National Economic Situation  0,434** 0,176 6,113 1,544 1,094 2,178 
Employment  0,144 0,140 1,052 1,155 0,877 1,520 
Personal Economic Situation  0,226* 0,136 2,747 1,254 0,960 1,638 
General Satisfaction  1,385*** 0,165 70,139 3,996 2,889 5,526 
Constant  -6,067*** 0,618 96,360 0,002   
        
N  640 
-2 log likelihood  667,107 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,255 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,346 
χ² (d.f.)   188,351 (4) 
National Economic Situation  0,210 0,271 0,596 1,233 0,724 2,099 
Employment  0,137 0,219 0,389 1,147 0,746 1,763 
Personal Economic Situation  0,169 0,211 0,642 1,184 0,783 1,789 
General Satisfaction  0,741** 0,244 9,185 2,097 1,299 3,386 
Age  0,034 0,054 0,395 1,035 0,930 1,150 
Sex  -1,061** 0,310 11,731 0,346 0,189 0,635 
Social Class  -0,069 0,166 0,174 0,933 0,673 1,293 
Religion  0,052 0,095 0,302 1,053 0,875 1,268 
Education  0,151 0,163 0,864 1,163 0,846 1,601 
Party Adherence  0,594*** 0,061 93,542 1,811 1,606 2,043 
Left-Right Distance  0,596*** 0,110 29,577 1,814 1,464 2,249 
Sympathy Party Leaders  0,200 0,123 2,648 1,222 0,960 1,555 
Faith Prime Minister  0,519*** 0,127 16,735 1,680 1,310 2,154 
Constant  -12,580*** 1,629 59,624 0,000   
        
N  640 
-2 log likelihood  329,49 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,560 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,760 
χ² (d.f.)   525,969 (13) 
* = sig at .05 level; ** =  sig at .01 level; *** = sig at .001 level 
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1.3 Elections of 1994 
 
National Economic Situation  0,283 0,266 1,131 1,327 0,788 2,233 
Employment  -0,091 0,272 0,112 0,913 0,536 1,556 
Personal Economic Situation  0,002 0,224 0,000 1,002 0,645 1,556 
General Satisfaction  0,046 0,229 0,040 1,047 0,669 1,639 
Age  0,095* 0,050 3,631 1,099 0,997 1,211 
Sex  -0,545* 0,298 3,352 0,580 0,323 1,039 
Social Class  -0,117 0,172 0,460 0,890 0,635 1,247 
Religion  -0,014 0,103 0,018 0,986 0,805 1,208 
Education  0,098 0,152 0,417 1,103 0,819 1,485 
Party Adherence  0,513*** 0,058 78,326 1,670 1,491 1,871 
Left-Right Distance  0,218** 0,111 3,850 1,243 1,000 1,545 
Sympathy Party Leaders  0,174* 0,093 3,464 1,190 0,991 1,428 
Faith Prime Minister  0,208** 0,085 5,993 1,231 1,042 1,454 
Constant  -4,517** 1,343 11,315 0,011   
        
N  395 
-2 log likelihood  311,2 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,448 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,599 
χ² (d.f.)   235,046 (13) 
* = sig at .05 level; ** =  sig at .01 level; *** = sig at .001 level 
 
Table 7c. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting for Government at 
Elections in 1994 
 
 B S.E. Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95,0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
 
     Lower Upper 
National Economic Situation  0,336* 0,190 3,146 1,400 0,965 2,03 
Employment  0,301 0,193 2,431 1,352 0,925 1,974 
Personal Economic Situation  0,238 0,163 2,138 1,269 0,922 1,746 
General Satisfaction  0,432** 0,159 7,409 1,540 1,128 2,101 
Constant  -2,687*** 0,500 28,847 0,068   
        
N  395 
-2 log likelihood  506,298 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,096 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,128 
χ² (d.f.)   39,948 (4) 
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1.4 Elections of 1998 
Table 7d. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting for Government at 
Elections in 1998 
 
 B S.E. Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95,0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
 
     Lower Upper 
National Economic Situation  0,428** 0,161 7,075 1,533 1,119 2,101 
Employment  0,040 0,144 0,079 1,041 0,786 1,380 
Personal Economic Situation  0,065 0,125 0,275 1,068 0,836 1,363 
General Satisfaction  0,315** 0,126 6,245 1,370 1,070 1,754 
Constant  -2,361*** 0,526 20,120 0,094   
        
N  619 
-2 log likelihood  832,109 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,041 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,054 
χ² (d.f.)   25,734 (4) 
National Economic Situation  0,482* 0,259 3,462 1,619 0,975 2,688 
Employment  0,181 0,22 0,678 1,198 0,779 1,844 
Personal Economic Situation  -0,019 0,189 0,011 0,981 0,677 1,42 
General Satisfaction  -0,198 0,208 0,903 0,821 0,546 1,234 
Age  0,004 0,046 0,007 1,004 0,917 1,099 
Sex  -0,758** 0,272 7,743 0,468 0,275 0,799 
Social Class  -0,076 0,164 0,215 0,927 0,672 1,278 
Religion  -0,433*** 0,096 20,456 0,649 0,538 0,783 
Education  0,213 0,116 3,409 1,238 0,987 1,553 
Party Adherence  0,736*** 0,069 114,026 2,088 1,824 2,39 
Left-Right Distance  0,178 0,109 2,66 1,195 0,965 1,479 
Sympathy Party Leaders  0,171 0,111 2,385 1,187 0,955 1,475 
Faith Prime Minister  0,288* 0,156 3,414 1,334 0,983 1,811 
Constant  -3,805** 1,577 5,822 0,022   
        
N  619 
-2 log likelihood  380,198 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,538 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,717 
χ² (d.f.)   477,645 (13) 
* = sig at .05 level; ** =  sig at .01 level; *** = sig at .001 level 
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1.5 Elections of 2002 
Table 7e. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting for Government at 
Elections in 2002 
 
 B S.E. Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95,0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
 
     Lower Upper 
National Economic Situation  -0,044 0,163 0,072 0,957 0,695 1,318 
Employment  0,357** 0,182 3,852 1,429 1,000 2,042 
Personal Economic Situation  0,028 0,145 0,038 1,028 0,775 1,366 
General Satisfaction  0,749*** 0,140 28,649 2,115 1,608 2,783 
Constant  -4,168*** 0,584 50,852 0,015   
        
N  569 
-2 log likelihood  626,416 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,087 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,124 
χ² (d.f.)   51,514 (4) 
National Economic Situation  0,057 0,256 0,051 1,059 0,642 1,748 
Employment  0,094 0,270 0,121 1,098 0,648 1,863 
Personal Economic Situation  -0,052 0,212 0,060 0,950 0,627 1,438 
General Satisfaction  0,503** 0,228 4,851 1,654 1,057 2,589 
Age  0,018 0,051 0,122 1,018 0,921 1,125 
Sex  0,038 0,293 0,017 1,038 0,585 1,842 
Social Class  0,027 0,174 0,025 1,028 0,731 1,445 
Religion  -0,201* 0,109 3,390 0,818 0,661 1,013 
Education  0,146 0,129 1,293 1,158 0,899 1,490 
Party Adherence  0,588*** 0,055 112,873 1,800 1,615 2,007 
Left-Right Distance  -0,027 0,123 0,050 0,973 0,765 1,238 
Sympathy Party Leaders  0,094 0,114 0,682 1,098 0,879 1,372 
Faith Prime Minister  0,108 0,086 1,562 1,114 0,941 1,319 
Constant  -3,684** 1,537 5,746 0,025   
        
N  569 
-2 log likelihood  328,901 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,458 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,659 
χ² (d.f.)   349,029 (13) 
* = sig at .05 level; ** =  sig at .01 level; *** = sig at .001 level 
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1.6 Elections of 2003 
 
Table 7f. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting for Government at 
Elections in 2003 
 
 B S.E. Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95,0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
 
     Lower Upper 
National Economic Situation        
Employment        
Personal Economic Situation        
General Satisfaction  0,829*** 0,117 50,185 2,292 1,822 2,883 
Constant  -1,892*** 0,326 33,672 0,151   
        
N  510 
-2 log likelihood  634,001 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,107 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,144 
χ² (d.f.)   57,749 (1) 
National Economic Situation        
Employment        
Personal Economic Situation        
General Satisfaction  0,361** 0,163 4,921 1,434 1,043 1,973 
Age  0,092** 0,046 3,944 1,096 1,001 1,201 
Sex  -0,046 0,265 0,030 0,955 0,568 1,606 
Social Class  0,412** 0,170 5,900 1,510 1,083 2,105 
Religion  -0,125 0,088 2,031 0,882 0,743 1,048 
Education  -0,150 0,108 1,932 0,860 0,696 1,064 
Party Adherence        
Left-Right Distance  0,889*** 0,105 72,248 2,433 1,982 2,987 
Sympathy Party Leaders  0,624*** 0,098 40,342 1,867 1,54 2,263 
Faith Prime Minister        
Constant  -12,003*** 1,318 82,984    
        
N  510 
-2 log likelihood  394,175 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,442 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,595 
χ² (d.f.)   297,575 (8) 
* = sig at .05 level; ** =  sig at .01 level; *** = sig at .001 level 
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1.7 Elections of 2006 
Table 7g. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting for Government at 
Elections in 2006 
 
 B S.E. Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95,0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
 
     Lower Upper 
National Economic Situation  0,249 0,324 0,589 1,282 0,680 2,420 
Employment  0,194 0,303 0,408 1,214 0,670 2,199 
Personal Economic Situation  0,256 0,279 0,843 1,292 0,748 2,230 
General Satisfaction  0,631** 0,265 5,684 1,880 1,119 3,159 
Constant  -3,412*** 0,830 16,875 0,033   
        
N  145 
-2 log likelihood  178,288 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,145 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,193 
χ² (d.f.)   22,663 (4) 
National Economic Situation  -0,045 0,417 0,012 0,956 0,423 2,163 
Employment  0,329 0,381 0,749 1,390 0,659 2,930 
Personal Economic Situation  0,208 0,371 0,314 1,231 0,595 2,545 
General Satisfaction  0,473 0,381 1,537 1,605 0,760 3,388 
Age  0,085 0,089 0,913 1,089 0,914 1,297 
Sex  -0,957* 0,501 3,653 0,384 0,144 1,025 
Social Class  -0,053 0,281 0,036 0,948 0,547 1,643 
Religion  -0,147 0,194 0,575 0,863 0,590 1,262 
Education  0,524** 0,237 4,898 1,689 1,062 2,685 
Party Adherence  0,626** 0,192 10,608 1,871 1,283 2,727 
Left-Right Distance  0,388** 0,196 3,925 1,474 1,004 2,165 
Sympathy Party Leaders        
Faith Prime Minister  0,393** 0,197 3,983 1,481 1,007 2,177 
Constant  -9,526*** 2,486 14,682 0   
        
N  145 
-2 log likelihood  114,456 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,449 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,599 
χ² (d.f.)   86,495 (13) 
* = sig at .05 level; ** =  sig at .01 level; *** = sig at .001 level 
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1.8 One model for the elections of 1986 to 2002 
 
Table 7h. Logistic Regression Predicting Likelihood of Voting for Government at 
Elections in 1986-2002 
 
 B S.E. Wald 
Odds 
Ratio 
95,0% C.I. for 
Odds Ratio 
 
     Lower Upper 
National Economic Situation  0,327*** 0,073 20,026 1,387 1,202 1,600 
Employment  0,002 0,064 0,001 1,002 0,884 1,136 
Personal Economic Situation  -0,037 0,061 0,366 0,964 0,856 1,086 
General Satisfaction  0,925*** 0,063 213,809 2,523 2,229 2,856 
Constant  
-
3,690*** 0,225 268,502 0,025   
        
N  2729 
-2 log likelihood  3346,471 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,147 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,196 
χ² (d.f.)   433,952 (4) 
National Economic Situation  0,236** 0,111 4,526 1,267 1,019 1,575 
Employment  0,061 0,096 0,410 1,063 0,882 1,282 
ItPersonal Economic Situation  -0,030 0,090 0,110 0,971 0,813 1,158 
General Satisfaction  0,239** 0,100 5,754 1,270 1,045 1,544 
Age  0,008 0,021 0,143 1,008 0,968 1,050 
Sex  -0,438** 0,127 11,815 0,646 0,503 0,829 
Social Class  0,027 0,073 0,137 1,027 0,890 1,186 
Religion  -0,076* 0,043 3,201 0,927 0,852 1,007 
Education  0,006 0,056 0,013 1,006 0,902 1,123 
Party Adherence  0,639*** 0,027 554,707 1,895 1,797 1,998 
Left-Right Distance  0,271*** 0,047 33,714 1,312 1,197 1,437 
Sympathy Party Leaders  0,218*** 0,046 22,287 1,244 1,136 1,361 
Faith Prime Minister  0,270*** 0,036 56,642 1,310 1,221 1,405 
Constant  
-
5,950*** 0,581 104,755 0,003   
        
N  2729 
-2 log likelihood  1694,861 
Cox and Snell pseudo R²  0,534 
Nagelkerke pseudo R²  0,713 
χ² (d.f.)   2085,742 (13) 
* = sig at .05 level; ** =  sig at .01 level; *** = sig at .001 level 
 
 
